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Introduction and Historical Background
On 17 June 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolutions 
1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011) as a successor to resolution 1904 (2009), these resolutions extended 
for a further eighteen months the office of UN Ombudsperson which was established under 
Security Council Resolution to oversee the de-listing of those placed on the targeted sanctions list 
by a Committee which had been established under UN Resolution 1267 (1999). This paper will 
discuss the introduction and development of the role of Ombudsperson within the UN, examining 
the present and previous Resolutions and consider the legitimacy of the role in dealing with 
concerns over judicial protection for those subjected to these targeted sanctions.
This article will also consider if the introduction of the Ombudsperson and the other provisions 
contained within the new resolutions have managed to balance the UN’s competing needs to 
maintain international peace and security with upholding fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, as outlined for example within the Universal declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and other international human rights documents [2]. 
Following the formation of the United Nations, member states bound themselves through its 
charter to maintain international peace and security and to take collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to that peace as well as to promote and encourage respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (article 1 [3]). The Security Council had primary 
responsibility for maintaining this peace and security and member states agreed through the 
charter to be bound and carry out the decisions of the Security Council to achieve this end 
(Article 24).
Since the formation of the UN there have of course been numerous threats to international peace 
and security. Various Security Council Resolutions have been adopted, calling upon the members 
of the United Nations to take measures under article 41 of the UN Charter. Prior to the terrorist 
attacks carried out on 11 September 2001 (“9/11”) they were directed primarily to the 
interruption by means of sanctions of economic and other relations between states. As the 
Security Council's practice evolved they were directed to what states themselves might or might 
not do. SCR 1267(1999) provided for the freezing of funds and other financial resources derived 
from or generated from property owned or controlled by the Taliban Al Qaida, Osama Bin laden 
or by any undertaking owned or controlled by them. A ‘Sanctions Committee’ was established to 
oversee implementation of these measures, known as the 1267 Committee.
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Following 9/11 there was an appetite on the international stage, led mainly if unsurprisingly by 
the USA to give the UNSC a wide latitude in the measures it decided and the methods it 
employed to deal with international terrorism, however there were concerns regarding the lack of 
judicial protection for those subjected to these regimes and a call for a fundamental human rights 
to be upheld. Provision was finally made in Resolution 1822 (2008) for a de- listing procedure as 
well as a full review and maintenance of the Consolidated List. Individuals, groups, undertakings 
and entities were now given the option for the first time of submitting a petition for de-listing 
directly to a body known as the ‘Focal Point’. This Committee was directed by the UNSC to 
work, in accordance with the guidelines set by the Security Council [4], however these only 
require consideration for any petitions to be removed from the ‘Consolidated List’ those who the 
committee felt no longer met the criteria established in the relevant resolutions. However none of 
these processes actually entitle any person subjected to these measures to the right to be heard or 
for the committee to actually take any notice of the submissions given to them by those subjected 
to the measure or in fact any state actor petitioning on their behalf. 
Over time these measures have been developed and refined but are still criticised by some 
commentators as they lack an effective remedy being available to those subjected to the measures 
should they wish to be removed from the list and allow their assets to be unfrozen. [5]
Whilst the UN suggests the implementation of these measures by imposition of targeted 
sanctions is not supposed to be criminal in nature, merely a preventative ‘civil’ measures 
designed to change both behaviour and frustrate terrorist activities it does seem on the face of it 
that these measures have many similarities to those imposed to deal with and frustrate organised 
crime and other criminal activity, however, it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the 
actual effectiveness or other wise of these sanctions in their ability to diminish terrorist activity.
These reforms alone have not proved sufficient to satisfy the criticism of those who advocate 
human rights including the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the leading case involving UN 
sanctions, Kadi v Council of Europe [6] the ECJ was asked to consider the legality of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 implementing UN resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations for the freezing of the funds and economic resources controlled directly or 
indirectly by persons associated with Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda or the Taliban. It ordered the 
freezing of the funds and other economic resources of the person and entities whose names 
appeared on a list annexed to that regulation. Mr Kadi was one of those named on that list kept 
by the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations. Advocate General Maduro observed in his 
opinion that the existence of a de-listing procedure is purely a matter of intergovernmental 
consultation. There is no obligation on the Sanctions Committee actually to take the views of the 
petitioner into account. Moreover, the de-listing procedure does not provide even minimal access 
to the information on which the decision was based to include the petitioner in the list. [7] He 
said that within the EU the right to effective judicial protection holds a prominent place in the 
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firmament of fundamental rights [8]. Had there been a genuine and effective mechanism of 
judicial control by an independent tribunal at the level of the United Nations, this might he 
suggested, have released the Community from the obligation to provide this within the 
Community legal order but as there was not He considered Mr Kadi's claim that the regulation 
infringed his rights was well founded. [9] In its final judgment the ECJ endorsed this approach 
[10].
As well as the ECJ, the Federal Court of Canada also found that the de-listing procedure offered 
insufficient judicial protection. In Abdelrazik v Canada (Foreign Affairs) 2009 FC 580 Zinn J 
said that ‘I add my name to those who view the 1267 Committee regime as a denial of basic legal 
remedies and as untenable under the principles of international human rights’. He felt that there 
was nothing in the listing or de-listing procedure that recognises the principles of natural justice 
or that provided for basic procedural fairness. In Aldelrazik, Justice Zinn reiterated many familiar 
shortcoming of the 1267 regime, including that fact that the committee gives no reasons for its 
decisions not even in narrative form, despite the requirement to do so for some of those listed 
under SCR 1822
In September 2009 the UN’s own United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in its 
report entitled ‘Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, While Countering Terrorism [11]’ 
commented that because individual listings are currently open-ended in duration, they may result 
in a temporary freeze of assets becoming permanent which, in turn, may amount to criminal 
punishment due to the severity of the sanction. This threatens to go well beyond the purpose of 
the United Nations to combat the terrorist threat posed by an individual case. In addition the 
report points out there are no uniform standards in relation to evidentiary criteria and procedures 
by member States. This poses serious human rights issues, as all punitive decisions should be 
either judicial or subject to judicial review [12].
Introduction of Ombudsperson 
On 17 December 2009 the Security Council adopted SCR 1904(2009 [13]) which stated when 
considering de-listing requests, the Committee would now be assisted by an Ombudsperson 
appointed by the Secretary-General. The Ombudsman would deal with requests for de-listing 
from individuals and entities in accordance with procedures outlined in annex II to the resolution 
[14]. The Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Committee, was asked to appoint an 
eminent individual of high moral character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications and 
experience in relevant fields, such as legal, human rights, counter-terrorism and sanctions. In 
June 2010 Security Council Sanctions Committee appointed Judge Kimberly Prost, [15] as the 
first ombudsperson in accordance with UNSCR 1904. She formally commenced her role on 17 
July 2009. Although this role was seen by the UN as assisting the Committee in its consideration 
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of delisting requests received from individuals and entities subject to the Security Council’s 
relevant sanctions measures, it did not give her any particular power or authority over that 
committee’s decisions or its processes. The Ombudsperson was simply required to perform these 
tasks in an ‘independent and impartial manner’ and not to seek nor receive instructions from any 
government, in accordance with the procedures outlined in annex II of the resolution, which gave 
details of the time line to be followed when considering de-listing applications. Under this 
resolution now that this appointment has been made, it is the Ombudsperson, not the focal point 
mechanism established by SCR 1730 (2006) that receives any requests for removal from the 
1273 Committee.  The Focal Point would continue to receive requests from individuals and 
entities seeking to be removed from other sanctions lists established under SCR 1333, thereby 
creating a two tier de-listing procedure for those placed on sanctions under each committee. The 
initial period for the appointment of the 1267 Committee Ombudsperson was for eighteen 
months.
Petitioners seeking delisting could now present their case to an independent and impartial 
ombudsperson, who, after a period of information gathering and dialogue with the petitioner and 
relevant states, and with the help of a Monitoring Team, present a comprehensive report to the 
1267 Committee laying out the principal arguments concerning the delisting request based on an 
analysis of all the information available to the Ombudsperson and the Ombudsperson’s 
observations.  
The Committee saw the appointment of the ombudsperson as an important step in ensuring that 
the Sanctions Committee’s procedures for removing individuals and entities from the 
‘Consolidated List’ were seen by the international community as being both fair and clear, as 
called for by the General Assembly in October 2005 [16]. Whilst the Committee may have seen 
this appointment as going some way in address the concerns regarding transparency and fairness, 
the inability of ombudsperson to compel the sanctions committee to de-list anyone regardless of 
the evidence she may produce, nor her lack of authority to compel states to share with her any 
information or evidence that may have used to instigate listing in the first place has done little to 
remove the criticism that the appointment is nothing more than window dressing and still fails to 
provide a competent tribunal. 
Whilst giving judgement in the leading UK case involving UN sanctions, HM Treasury v Ahmed 
[17] Lord Hope commented on the implementation of an ombudsperson by the UN. Although he 
agreed these improvements were to be welcomed, he pointed out that the fact remained it did not 
amount to any form of effective judicial protection from those placed on the UN sanction list. In 
fact the inability of the 1267 Committee's procedures to provide an effective remedy meant that 
those subjected to this regime were unable to have their case heard by a competent tribunal 
capable of providing an effective judicial remedy [18]. In the present case he said was that what 
the complainants required was not a review from HM Treasury, which due to the UK’s 
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obligations under the UN charter was powerless to ‘un-designate’ them, but an effective means of 
subjecting the 1267 Committee to judicial review, something which at this present time, even 
with the imposition of the ombudsperson was not possible. [19]
The ombudsperson, submitted her first biannual report to the Council on 21 January 2011. The 
report summarised the initial phase for her office outlining the setup of her office and 
identification of the issues involved for the Council to consider. These included the need for the 
committee to provide reasons for its decisions on delisting persons from the targeted sanctions 
list. Also, she raised the practical need for the ombudsperson to be able to disclose the identity of 
the designating state to the petitioner and other relevant states. 
On 16 May 2011, the chairs of the 1267 Committee, the CTC (1373 Counterterrorism committee) 
and the 1540 committee (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism) 
addressed the Council in a regular biannual briefing. The chair of the 1267 Committee, 
Ambassador Peter Wittig of Germany, said that the Committee had built on last year's review of 
the consolidated list by approving the most comprehensive set of updates to the list in its history. 
The committee had recently agreed to 78 list amendments and to making publicly available 
almost 200 additional summaries of reasons for listing. The Committee is currently reviewing the 
listings of 48 individuals who are reported to be deceased and aims to conclude that review by 
the end of May before conducting other regular reviews requested in resolution 1904.
Wittig reported that to date the ombudsperson had received ten delisting requests and had 
submitted her first report on a specific delisting request to the committee in February. Two 
further ombudsperson reports on delisting requests were completed in April. He said the 
Committee is considering these delisting requests. He also recalled that resolution 1904 
encourages committee members to provide reasons for objecting to delisting requests. He said he 
had insisted that committee members do so promptly. The Committee had reached consensus on 
the form in which reasons for the Committee’s decision could be communicated on a case-by-
case basis. The Committee will also be considering a draft checklist of necessary supporting 
documentation for delisting requests from the government of Afghanistan. The Monitoring Team 
in its Eleventh Report to the 1267 Committee recommended that Member States treat listed 
Taliban and listed individuals and entities of Al-Qaida and its affiliates as two separate list. [20]
Renewal of Ombudsperson mandate UNSCR 1988 & 1989 (2011)
On 17 June 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolutions 1988 (2011) and 1989 
(2011) as a successor to resolution 1904 (2009). By adopting these two resolutions, the Security 
Council extended the office of ombudsperson and the monitoring team for a further period of 
eighteen months and split the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime into two separate lists as 
suggested by the like-minded countries and the monitoring team. Resolution 1989 (2011) 
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stipulates that the sanctions list maintained by the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) will henceforth be known as the “Al-Qaida Sanctions List” 
and include only names of those individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with 
Al-Qaida.
The new resolution recognises the administrative difficulties for the office of the ombudsperson 
and recommends that she is given more resources in order to fulfil her mandate which requires 
various actions to be completed within strict time limits that have been set. As far as extending 
her authority, the resolution makes it very clear that although Member States should provide the 
relevant information to enable her to make the correct recommendations of whether de-listing 
should take place, including where appropriate making available any relevant confidential 
information, the ombudsperson must still comply with any confidentiality restrictions which are 
placed on such information by the Member State providing it, she has been given no authority to 
decide herself what information may be released effectively only allowing the Ombudsperson to 
release only what the Member States allow.  
Where multiple states have submitted names for inclusion on the sanctions list then the resolution 
insists there must be consensus amongst them all before de-listing can be recommended. States 
that have designated are strongly urged but not compelled to allow the ombudsperson to reveal 
their identity as designating states.
This resolution further requests that Member States and relevant international organizations for 
example the ECJ are to encourage individuals and entities that are considering challenging or are 
already in the process of challenging their listing through the national and regional courts to seek 
removal from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List by submitting delisting petitions to the Office of the 
Ombudsperson in the first instance. Whether this will occur in practice remains to be seen. 
Certainly unless those subjected to this regime consider that the process offers sufficient judicial 
protection and the ability to offer an effective remedy it is difficult to imagine why they would 
engage in the process. The message seems far more likely to be for the benefit of states and other 
international organisations such as the EU in trying to control and direct their approach in dealing 
with UN sanctions in the light of the recent judgments and criticisms of the system for sanctions 
as seen in the ECJ decision in Kadi, Aldelrazik in Canada and Ahmed in the UK. Perhaps as an 
attempt to reassert the authority of the UN as the principle international organisation for the 
decision making process in cases involving UNSC sanctions regarding terrorism, which with the 
recent aforementioned regional and national cases may have started to lose credibility.
Annex two of this resolution gives the mandate for the Ombudsmen in detail. It is similar in 
effect to the 1904 document, it outlines the specific time scales to be employed when considering 
an application for de-listing, the ombudsperson is given four months in which to gather 
information from the petitioner who wishes to seek de-listing, during which period she must 
contact and inform them of the procedure under the resolution as well as requesting all the 
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relevant information from the State(s) concerned. On completion of this phase there is a two 
month dialogue process in which the ombudsperson discusses with the petitioner the information 
she is able to disclose. During this period she may ask specific questions of the petitioner and can 
if necessary lengthen this time in order to fully explore the answers given or likewise if she feels 
she has concluded her enquiries she can shorten the process. At the conclusion the ombudsperson 
should obtain a signed statement that the petitioner is not or no longer involved with Al-Qaida 
and nor will they be in the future.  On completion of this phase, the ombudsperson compiles a 
written report for the committee in which she considers all the information available to her from 
the relevant member states and the petitioner and then makes her recommendations to the 
Committee or whether de-listing should take place or not. The committee then has fifteen days to 
review this report and a further fifteen days to consider its recommendations. Should the 
ombudsperson recommend de-listing then the obligation of States to maintain sanctions on that 
petitioner will automatically cease after sixty days unless the Committee decides by consensus 
that the measures must remain. If consensus to maintain the petitioner on the list cannot be 
reached then a member of the committee may ask the chair to contact the Security Council for a 
decision within a further sixty days of whether the petitioner should be delisted or not. If the 
Committee decides to reject a request for de-listing by the ombudsperson, then the Committee 
shall tell her their reasons for this decision. If the petitioner is not successful in their request the 
ombudsperson should write to them explaining in as much detail as is allowed under the 
circumstances the reasons for continued listing. Now under this new resolution no matter before 
the committee should take more than six months to complete unless there are exceptional 
circumstances which will only be considered on a case by case basis. It is not made clear under 
what circumstances a petitioner made reapply for de-listing if unsuccessful this stage.
Conclusion
Whilst these new SCR’s  make minor changes in terms of time lines and an assumption to 
remove individuals and entities from the list unless the Committee makes a positive decision to 
the contrary, they are unlikely to be seen as going far enough by many to satisfy the concerns 
over judicial protection for those subjected to the regime. The office of Ombudsperson whilst 
clearly a step forward in offering some protection to those subjected to sanctions does not carry 
any additional authority of ability to compel the committee to accept her recommendations, 
disclose information or even reveal their identity. The issues and concerns regarding judicial 
protection highlight the problems of having an essentially political body such as the UNSC 
making what are quasi legal decisions on the international level. Under the UN Charter there is 
no separation of powers the Security Council having been given all three roles, legislative 
executive and judiciary. The strongest hand the UN Ombudsperson may hold is more likely to be 
on the political front in that the Committee is committed to explain why it should not follow any 
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recommendation to de-list made by her. Whilst many agree that there are still significant 
shortcomings in the judicial safeguards for listing and delisting there is still major disagreement 
of how these issues should be tackled. Some members were supportive of some kind of time limit  
or sunset clause relating to listings however the new resolution only requires review every three 
years it seems that long term inclusion on the list will remain the norm. Recent decisions from 
the ECJ and other courts may be heralding a sea change certainly of legal opinion regarding 
sanctions that have been in place for nearly ten years post 9/11. With the recent death of Osama 
Bin Laden the mood to continue to allow the UN its wide approach to employing sanctions is 
slowly being challenged and eroded. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights pointed out, 
the longer individuals and entities are left on these lists, the more it appears to be more of a 
criminal sanction where there is a need for full judicial protection and review which at this time 
is not currently available.
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